Amici Brief of Constitutional Scholars, Retired Judges, and Former Public Officials – 04.28.25
Amici Brief of Constitutional Scholars, Retired Judges, and Former Public Officials
Joint Brief of Amici Curiae:
Former Senator and Governor George F. Allen
Professor Steven Calabresi
Attorney Joshua A. Claybourn
Former Senator & Ambassador to the United Nations John C. Danforth
Professor Richard A. Epstein
Former Senator & Secretary of Defense Charles T. Hagel
Professor & Former Dean Harold Hongju Koh
Professor Gerard N. Magliocca
Professor & Former Judge Michael W. McConnell
Former Attorney General & Judge Michael B. Mukasey
Professor Alan Sykes
Former Judge John Daniel Tinder
Former White House Counsel Peter Wallison
Former State Department Counselor & Director of the 9/11 Commission Philip Zelikow
Amici are constitutional scholars, legal historians, public lawyers, retired federal appellate judges, a former United States Attorney General, and three former United States Senators united by a common conviction: the endurance of the American Republic depends not only on elections or policy outcomes, but on the faithful preservation of its constitutional structure.
They span the ideological spectrum, joined not by partisanship but by a common concern over the erosion of Congress’s Article I authority. Amici also include former federal appellate judges and other senior officials who, though not elected, were entrusted with solemn constitutional duties. In their service on the bench and in high office, they bore responsibility for interpreting and upholding the Constitution—often in precisely the kinds of disputes over executive authority and congressional power now before this Court.
Several amici—including a former Attorney General of the United States—held senior executive positions and daily grappled questions of constitutional power and duty. Notably, three amici served as United States Senators, directly engaged in the legislative processes now at risk of displacement. Their firsthand experience in crafting, debating, and enacting legislation gives them a deep understanding of the constitutional balance between Congress and the Executive.
They are acutely aware of the stakes when lawmaking authority shifts from the collective deliberation of Congress to unilateral executive action. Amici do not appear to defend or oppose any particular trade policy. They file this brief because they believe the Constitution draws bright lines between legislative and executive power—and that those lines are being blurred in ways that threaten democratic accountability itself.
What unites these amici is a shared conviction that process matters—that how we govern is as vital as what we decide. The powers to tax, to regulate commerce, and to shape the nation’s economic course must remain with Congress. They cannot drift silently into the hands of the President through inertia, inattention, or creative readings of statutes never meant to grant such authority. That conviction is not partisan. It is constitutional. And it strikes at the heart of this case.
This dispute is not about the wisdom of tariffs or the politics of trade. It is about who holds the power to tax the American people. May a President, absent a clear delegation from Congress and without guidance that amounts to an intelligible principle, unilaterally impose sweeping tariffs under laws never designed for that purpose? This is not a debate over outcomes but a test of structure. It asks not what should happen, but who decides.